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ABSTRACT 
It is my aim to compare the conceptual and historical paths that led Bohr and 
Schrödinger to develop their positions with regard to the phenomenon of 
entanglement. For this purpose, the concept of holism and non-separability in 
relation to the views of Bohr and Schrödinger will be crucial for reconstructing 
their standpoints. The idea will be upheld that the concept of non-separability 
underlies the phenomenon of entanglement. Furthermore, I shall place 
emphasis on the divergences between Bohr and Schrödinger in spite of their 
shared holistic world view. 
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 The Holistic Aspect of the Phenomenon of 
Entanglement 
 
 
 
R O B E R T O  A N G E L O N I   
 
 
 
 
§1. Introduction 
HE THESIS OF HOLISM has found interesting applications in connection 
with various interpretations of quantum theory. As is known, the 
general definition of holism states: the whole is more than the sum of 
its parts. This claim is relevant in the sense that it entails one of the main 
differences between classical physics and quantum physics (Healey 2009). That is 
to say: while, in classical physics, a system can be analysed into parts, whose state 
and properties determine the whole they compose, such a line of reasoning 
cannot be applied to quantum mechanics. To say it with the words of Healey, 
even when a compound system has a pure state, some of its subsystems may not 
have their own pure states (Healey 2009). Following this consideration on the 
quantum theory, Schrödinger called such composite subsystems as “entangled”. 
Quantum entanglement is a quantum-mechanical phenomenon, which 
describes the quantum states, for instance, of two objects, in such a way that 
measuring the quantum states of one of the objects under considerations 
conditions the measurement of the other objects, even though the two objects 
may be spatially separated. Furthermore, a characterization of quantum 
entanglement can be given in terms of non-separability, according to which two 
or more systems are non-separable if and only if it is only the joint state of the 
whole that completely determines the state-dependent properties of each system 
and the correlations among these systems (Esfeld 2004). 
I will use recent literature to distinguish methodological holism from 
metaphysical holism. Methodological holism states that the best way to 
understand the behaviour of a complex system is to treat it as a whole, whereas 
metaphysical holism maintains the idea that the nature of “some wholes” is not 
determined by the nature of their component parts (Healey 1991, 2009). 
T 
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Metaphysical holism can be divided into three categories: ontological holism, 
physical property holism, and nomological holism. 
By definition, ontological holism states: there are physical objects that are not 
wholly composed of basic physical parts. Physical property holism deals with the 
issue that the physical properties of some objects are not determined by the 
physical properties of their parts. According to nomological holism, some objects 
obey laws that are not determined by fundamental physical laws governing the 
structure and behaviour of their basic physical parts (cf. Healey 2009). 
The concept of holism will be analysed and compared in relation to the views 
expressed by Bohr and Schrödinger in order to assess the characteristic traits of 
their respective holistic approaches starting from their early works. Furthermore, 
I will show the extent to which the concepts of holism and non-separability played 
a role in determining Bohr’s and Schrödinger’s viewpoints with respect to the 
entanglement. 
In 1935, Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen wrote a paper in which a thought-
experiment was presented, which brought to light some paradoxical 
consequences stemming from the accepted formulation of quantum mechanics. 
This paradox confirmed the existence of quantum entanglement as a 
consequence of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, and 
Schrödinger’s view, which were incompatible with the postulate of the limit of 
the velocity of light according to Einstein’s theory of special relativity. 
 
§1.2 Holism and non-separability in Niels Bohr’s philosophy of 
physics 
According to literature on Niels Bohr (1885-1962), elements of holism seem 
traceable back at least to the definition of the stationary states (1912-1913), and 
perhaps to his early work on the electron theory of metals published in 1911. 
Norton Wise, for instance, has argued that Bohr believed the discontinuity of 
Planck’s oscillators and the associated expression of entropy derived from non- 
mechanical, holistic phenomena among collections of electrons (Norton Wise 
1997, p. 415). 
Following this interpretation, Bohr’s advance in 1913 may be also regarded as 
a decision to ascribe holistic features to single atomic systems rather than to the 
electron gas. This breakthrough happened in the context of Bohr’s work on 
Rutherford’s nuclear planetary model of the atom and in connection with 
discontinuous radioactive transitions. Bohr believed that for an atom in a 
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stationary state, the electrons, the nucleus and their Coulomb field had to be 
regarded as an integral unit. Similarly in 1911-1912, he had supposed that 
Planck’s discrete oscillator states derived from collective motion in an electron 
gas (Norton Wise 1997). 
However, we should be cautious about ascribing an explicit holistic outlook 
to Bohr immediately from the formulation of his first atomic theory. In 1913 Bohr 
implicitly treated transitions between stationary states as individual processes, 
implying the individuality of the quantum of action (Planck’s h) as a starting 
point. However, it was only in the late 1920s that Bohr started to speak about the 
individuality of quantum processes. It was not until his later essays that the 
expressions “individuality”, “indivisibility”, “wholeness”, and “atomicity” 
appeared in connection with the quantum of action. 
What precisely did Bohr think about the holistic aspects of atomic processes? 
Bohr scholarship seems to have overlooked the problem of the conceptual 
shift in the role of the quantum hypothesis from 1913 to the subsequent 
formulation of the theory. Indeed, a conceptual shift seems to characterize the 
role and function of the quantum of action from 1913 to 1927 within Bohr’s 
scientific theories. 
In 1912-1913 Bohr had already become aware of the discontinuity inherent 
in atomic processes. From then on, Bohr strove to demonstrate the existence of 
stationary states1 
In the 1927 Como Lecture, “The Quantum Postulate and the Recent 
Development of Atomic Theory”, Bohr used the expression “discontinuity, or 
rather individuality” to refer to the “quantum postulate”. 
 
Notwithstanding the difficulties which, hence, are involved in the formulation of the 
quantum theory, it seems, as we shall see, that its essence may be expressed in the so-called 
quantum postulate, which attributes to any atomic process an essential discontinuity, or 
rather individuality, completely foreign to the classical theories and symbolized by Planck’s 
quantum of action (Bohr 1929, p. 53. Italics by the present author). 
 
In my view, there is a conceptual leap from the “discontinuity” of 1913’s quantum 
postulates and the “essential discontinuity, or rather individuality, completely 
 
1  Bohr used this expression in a lecture given to the Chemical Society in Copenhagen (2 December 1919), 
‘On the program of the newer atomic physics’: “It will be seen that these experiments (Franck-Hertz 
experiments from 1913) give the most direct experimental evidence imaginable for the existence of 
stationary states of atoms, assumed originally on purely theoretical grounds to account for the peculiar 
formulas holding for the frequencies of the spectra of the elements” (NBCW 3, 222). 
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foreign to classical physics” of 1927 Como Lecture. In addition, we cannot forget 
that as a consequence of the publication of Heisenberg’s 1925 reinterpretation 
paper, the second postulate, the frequency rule, was dropped from the new 
matrix theory, although Schrödinger’s version of quantum mechanics allowed its 
provisional revival. 
In 1927 Bohr thought he had already succeeded in defining stationary states. 
He claimed, indeed, they expressed the very essence of the quantum theory. 
What we can take for granted is the fact that in 1913 Bohr had only assumed 
the existence of the stationary states, while in 1927 they had become an essential 
part of the new quantum theory. 
Furthermore, we should consider that in 1925 the existence of stationary states 
was regarded as being as natural a feature of the theory as the existence of 
discrete vibration frequencies in classical theory (Heisenberg-Born-Jordan 1925, 
p. 558). Specifically, the Copenhagen-Göttingen School regarded the stationary 
states as mathematically deducible in the framework of the new matrix 
mechanics. The difference between the stationary states of Heisenberg’s 
reinterpretation paper (and the three-man paper as well) and the “stationary 
states” presented in Bohr’s Como lecture rests upon the fact that in 1925 
Heisenberg had managed to obtain only a mathematical value that expressed the 
stationary states. It was in the light of Schrödinger’s wave mechanics, and of the 
Davisson-Germer experiments on the reflections of electrons in crystals that 
Bohr, on his side, was able to define the “stationary states” as an essential part of 
the new quantum theory, as Bohr himself admitted some years later. In the 
unpublished manuscript “Philosophical foundations of the quantum theory”, 
written before the 1927 Como lecture, Bohr claimed that the stationary states 
were no longer a separate assumption, and had become a proper element of 
subatomic phenomena. 
Bohr’s quotation hence represents a further development of Heisenberg’s 
considerations on the stationary states given in his reinterpretation paper: 
 
The quantum theory has entered a new stage in which the existence of stationary states does 
not appear as a separate postulate, but where each such state appears as a possible proper 
vibration of the wave equation, similar to the harmonic waves in free space representing a 
component of a radiation field (NBCW 6, p. 70, Italics by the present author). 
 
Why was this “individuality” and the later additions of “indivisibility” and 
“wholeness” so recurrent in Bohr’s writings, and why did it seem so important in 
Bohr’s thinking? 
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Bohr thought of the quantum of action and the stationary states (Bohr used 
these two terms as synonyms from 1927) as an element of irrationality bringing 
about a discontinuity in quantum phenomena that must be rationally defined, as 
is clearly stated in his “On the Quantum Theory of Line-Spectra” from 1918. 
In this regard, since its introduction (and in connection with the concept of 
energy quantization) the quantum of action was seen as an “external” and 
irrational element, and a theory had to be developed to re-establish the 
continuity and rationality of physical science. Furthermore, this is an issue that 
links with an important aspect of Bohr’s philosophical interpretation of quantum 
mechanics: the meaning of a word demands continuity. This consideration also 
leads us to grasp the importance of the indispensability of classical concepts in 
Bohr’s philosophy of physics. 
Bohr was firmly convinced that the causal spatio-temporal description of 
classical physics presupposes continuity, as this description is intrinsically 
connected with the organization of our sensory experience. The concepts of 
classical physics are based on our sensory experience, although these concepts 
break down when they describe quantum phenomena. 
From 1928 Bohr constantly spoke of the failure of the forms of perception 
adapted to our ordinary sensory impressions. Bohr included causality as well as 
space and time in the forms of perception: “Causality may be considered as a 
mode of perception by which we reduce our sense impressions to order” (Bohr 
1929, pp. 116-117). 
Bohr’s inappropriate use of “forms of perception” with respect to causality 
probably derives from Harald Høffding’s misleading interpretation of Kant’s 
Transcendental Aesthetic. 
As is well known, according to Kant, causality is a category, a concept of 
understanding, rather than a form. Høffding, a professor of philosophy at 
Copenhagen, a friend of Bohr’s father and Niels’ mentor, linked continuity, 
causality, space and time as forms of perception, contrary to Kant’s usage 
(Høffding 1908, pp. 52, 58, see Murdoch 1987). 
Moreover, Høffding regarded continuity as an essential condition that the 
forms of perception and the categories of cognition are required to possess. The 
forms of perception are thus the means by which we organize our perceptual 
experience. They express the conceptual structure of classical physics, through 
which the macroscopic world can be interpreted. 
However, the classical forms of perception are not necessarily applicable to 
the microphysical world. Coherently, in 1926 Bohr wrote to Schrödinger: “the 
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definition of every word essentially presupposes the continuity of phenomena 
and becomes ambiguous as soon as this presupposition no longer applies” (Letter 
from Bohr to Schrödinger, 2 December 1926, NBCW 6, p. 462). 
In this view, ordinary language is designed in order to organize our sensory 
experience and it presupposes the condition of continuity. If this presupposition 
failed, ordinary language, including the models in terms of which we interpret 
physical theory, would become ambiguous. 
The discontinuity and individuality of the quantum of action brought about 
a problem of visualizability, which is the characteristic trait of classical theory, but 
is denied to quantum physics. 
The individuality of the quantum of action pertains to a general conception 
of quantum reality, raising doubts on the validity of the ontological interpretation 
of quantum mechanics “in terms of an objective stochastic process” (Bohm 1993). 
Bohr and Heisenberg argued that in the measurement of p and x 
(representing position and momentum variables of a particle), the maximum 
possible accuracy given by the uncertainty principle p x > h is a limitation on the 
possible accuracy and relevance of our knowledge of the observed system. 
If we take Bohr’s amendment to Heisenberg’s microscope argument into 
account, we shall arrive at the conclusion that the ambiguity in attributing the 
location of a point P is bound to the wave nature of the quantum that links the 
point P to the focal point Q of the microscope lens. 
As David Bohm explained: “The Quantum has a momentum hν/c and it 
produces a change of momentum in the particle p = hν sin θ/c where θ is the 
angle through which the quantum has been scattered by the particle. The 
individuality of the quantum guarantees that its momentum cannot be reduced 
below this value” (Bohm 1993, p. 15). 
This position undermines the ontological interpretation of quantum 
mechanics, because the basic properties of the particle (position and 
momentum) are not simply uncertain to us, rather there is no other way to give 
a more accurate definition beyond the limits set by the Heisenberg microscope 
argument. This argument brought about a new way of describing the experiment, 
in which the phenomenon is seen as an entire whole that cannot be analysed into 
parts. 
Bohr was convinced of the impossibility of finding a clear demarcation 
between the observing apparatus and the observed object because of the 
indivisibility and individuality of the quantum of action. It follows from Bohr’s 
argument that very little can be said about quantum ontology, that is, on the 
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existence of particles and fields considered as being essentially independent from 
the observer. Bohr never spoke of a quantum object standing on its own, he 
regarded the phenomenon (the interaction between observing apparatus and 
observed object) as an un-analysable whole. Bohr’s holistic position was a 
consequence of his assumptions on the nature of the quantum of action, which 
is indivisible and produces unpredictable and uncontrollable consequences in 
each individual case (Bohm 1993, p. 14). On such a basis, even Bohr’s 
interpretation of the phenomenon of entanglement is a mere consequence of 
his assumptions with regard to the quantum of action. 
This is a point that Bohr clearly stressed in his 1935 reply to the EPR (Einstein-
Podolski-Rosen) paper:  
 
The impossibility of a closer analysis of the reactions between the particle and the 
measurement instrument is indeed no peculiarity of the experimental procedure described, 
but is rather an essential property of any arrangement suited to the study of the phenomena 
of the type concerned, where we have to do with a feature of individuality completely foreign 
to classical physics (Bohr 1935, p. 697). 
 
§3. Holism and non-separability in relation to Schrödinger’s 
interpretation of quantum mechanics 
Schrödinger’s interpretation of quantum mechanics is characterized by a holistic 
conception of nature, which can be recognized as early as his works on statistical 
thermodynamics in the mid-twenties. 
Schrödinger’s work in statistical physics (1912-1925) can be divided in three 
main periods (Darrigol 1992, p. 255): the first in which he favoured the 
molecular view point; the second in which he switched to a holistic statistical 
method, while still analysing the global state of the system in terms of individual 
molecules; the third in which he shifted to an entirely holistic approach. 
Elements of holism in Schrödinger’s theoretical attitude trace back to his 
adhesion to the Bohr-Kramers-Slater theory (BKS) (known as the theory of virtual 
oscillators) with the paper “Bohrs neue Strahlungshypothese und der 
Energiesatz” (Bohr’s new radiation theory and the energy principle) from 1924. 
Can we speak of an organic and consistent holistic project put forward by 
Schrödinger until the end of his career? 
The legitimacy of the question lies in the fact that the fundamental concepts 
of such a holistic approach had to coexist with some concepts of the particle-like 
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interpretation of quantum physics from the outset of Schrödinger’s scientific 
work. 
As mentioned above, Schrödinger’s paper on the so-called theory of virtual 
oscillators offers the first glimpse of his holistic attitude. The BKS paper aimed to 
reconcile the quantum properties of atoms with the continuity of the 
electromagnetic fields. The BKS theory hypothesized that atoms communicate 
with one another through a spatio-temporal mechanism, which is “virtually 
equivalent with the field of radiation” of classical electromagnetism. But it is not 
the virtual field that bears energy, it rather induces transitions between the 
stationary states of atoms. 
Schrödinger welcomed almost every element of the theory. He wrote to Bohr: 
 
The renunciation of causality touches me extraordinarily sympathetically. As pupil of the 
venerable Franz Exner I have been on intimate terms for a long time with the idea that 
probably no microscopic lawfulness but perhaps ‘absolute accident’ forms the foundation 
of our statistics, and that perhaps even the energy and momentum principles are only 
statistically valid (Schrödinger to Bohr, 24 May 1924, in Darrigol 1992, p. 267). 
 
In the paper at issue, Schrödinger pointed out that the average squared 
fluctuation of the energy of a gas of Bohr atoms interacting in the BKS manner 
via the virtual fields would increase linearly in time. 
The linear increase of fluctuations, as Schrödinger wrote, could be distributed 
over an ever-increasing number of atoms. Bohr regarded such a remark as a 
serious objection to the BKS theory, although it was not Schrödinger’s intention 
to refute it. In fact, Schrödinger himself was searching for minor changes to be 
applied to the theory. For instance: by increasing the size of the system, the 
deviation would be reduced; in addition, regarding such system as a subsystem of 
a more extended system would compensate the infinite increase of temperature. 
Here Schrödinger’s recourse to descriptive holism in supporting his idea is 
evident: 
 
A certain stability of world events sub specie aeternitatis can only exist through the connection 
of each individual system with the rest of the world. A separated individual system would be, 
from the point of view of the all, chaos. The connection is needed as a continuing 
regulation, in relation to energy, the system would wander about aimlessly. – Is it gratuitous 
play with thoughts to let one perceive a similarity with social, ethical, and cultural 
phenomena? (Schrödinger 1924, from Darrigol 1992, p. 268). 
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The system does not wander about at random if the connection of the given 
system with the rest of the world is ensured. The kind of holism to which 
Schrödinger alludes to here is required in order to describe atomic reality and to 
account for the stability and therefore the existence of the world. For this reason, 
it can also be defined as descriptive, as it represents the state of things as regards 
the subatomic phenomena. 
Descriptive holism is also used in the social sciences to define a group of social 
entities (villages, for instance) that have been put in a wider context. It is worth 
noting that Schrödinger concluded the paragraph quoted above by placing 
emphasis on the similarity between quantum phenomena and social phenomena. 
As I see it, there is a conceptual transition from the descriptive holism of his 
1924 paper to the constitutive holism arising from the 1925 and 1926 works: 
“Bemerkungen über die statistische Entropiedefinition beim idealen Gas” 
(Remarks on the statistical definition of entropy for an ideal gas), 1925; “Zur 
Einsteinschen Gastheorie” (On Einstein’s theory of gases), 1926; “Die 
Energiestufen des idealen einatomigen Gasmodels” (The energy states of the 
ideal monoatomic gas model), 1926. 
Schrödinger became aware that holism was intrinsically (and constitutively) 
connected with the statistical behaviour of quantum systems, as emerges from the 
Communication addressed to the Berlin Academy in 1925. On this occasion, 
Schrödinger began to develop his ever more stringent version of holism, in which 
he showed that Born’s and Brody’s quantum theoretical derivation of the specific 
heat of solids at high temperature could be replaced by a simpler classical 
derivation based on Gibbs’ canonical method. As Darrigol has clearly shown, this 
is the first occurrence of the holistic method (see methodological holism) in 
Schrödinger’s writings. Until then Boltzmann’s distribution for individual 
molecules had been Schrödinger’s main reference point, while in 1925’s 
Communication at the Berlin Academy he went to rely on the concept of ensembles 
through the application of Gibbs’ method (Darrigol 1992, p. 247). 
It is worth noticing a tension between the theoretical feature of the definition 
of entropy, which expresses a holistic character, and the “practical” necessity of 
breaking the picture into individual molecules, which is entailed in carrying out 
calculations. 
There is a line of demarcation between Schrödinger’s holistic view and the 
aspects of holism arising from Bohr’s approach. Indeed, in spite of his holistic 
standpoint, Schrödinger raised doubts on the fundamental role of stationary 
states and quantum jumps (postulate of the frequency rule) in the new quantum 
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theory. As is evident, there is irony here. Wholeness and indivisibility were also 
implicit aspects of the two quantum postulates of Bohr’s 1913 model of the 
hydrogen atom. Schrödinger argued that, in his view, the “orthodox” 
interpretation of quantum mechanics was fuelled by the particle-like ontology. 
For this reason Schrödinger aimed to eradicate quantum jumps and 
corpuscolarism, as he regarded these fundamental assumptions as a remnant of 
classical ontology. 
With regard to quantum jumps, Schrödinger claimed: “it seems to me that 
there is a very strange relation between Heisenberg’s uncertainty relation and the 
claim of discrete quantum states. On account of the former, the latter can really 
not be experimentally tested” (letter from Schrödinger to Bohr, 5 May, 1928, 
from NBCW 6, p. 47). This is a crucial point in Schrödinger’s critique of the 
Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics.  
Schrödinger’s line of thought was characterized by the rejection of any 
descriptive discontinuity, which also forms the basis of his “treatment of the 
measurement problem” (Bitbol 1996, p. 110). 
The measurement problem and Heisenberg’s uncertainty relations are 
closely related. As we have seen, Heisenberg and Bohr regarded the uncertainty 
relations as the expression of an undeterminable disturbing influence exerted 
on an object by the very act of measurement. 
How can we describe Schrödinger’s position with regard to the measurement 
problem? 
In the 1935 “cat” paper, Schrödinger introduced the word entanglement and 
regarded the concept of the “wave-function” as a “catalogue of information”. 
According to this interpretation, if two interacting systems “enter a situation 
in which they influence each other, and separate again, then there occurs 
regularly that which I have just called entanglement of our knowledge of the two 
bodies” (Schrödinger 1935a, p. 161). 
What did the measuring process yield? Schrödinger’s answer does not leave 
any doubt: if we apply the measuring process to a combined system (measuring 
apparatus and measured object) we are able “to avoid (…) the singular quantum 
jump of the ψ-function” (Schrödinger 1935a, p. 161). 
The ψ-function of the measured object has become entangled with the ψ-
function of the apparatus. As a consequence, one can deduce that the measuring 
process leads to a holistic catalogue of information for the combined system that 
excludes the quantum jumps. 
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Secondly, Schrödinger used Heisenberg’s uncertainty relations in order to 
undermine the concept of particle. According to Heisenberg, “(…) the 
uncertainty relation specifies the limits within which the particle picture can be 
applied” (Heisenberg 1930, p. 15). 
Schrödinger sought to demonstrate, instead, that the particle picture is always 
unsuitable. His emphasis on the violations of Heisenberg’s uncertainty relations 
when they are referred to past events can also be seen as part of Schrödinger’s 
strategy against the particle-like approach. 
Let us focus for the purpose on the uncertainty relations. One cannot know 
the position and the momentum of a given particle because any measurement of 
one variable (position, for instance) alters the value of the other variable 
(momentum, for instance). Heisenberg then derived that the uncertainty 
relations cannot refer to the past, as he was convinced that the “knowledge of the 
past is of a purely speculative character, since it can never (…) be subjected to 
experimental verification” (Heisenberg 1930, p. 15). On the other side, in 
Schrödinger’s view, the problem of the retrospective ascription of values arises 
from the fact that Heisenberg focused on a well-defined object, that is a particle; 
a conclusion that could be avoided by adopting a time-independent Schrödinger 
equation in the non-relativistic limit in opposition to the particle-like approach.  
The concept of particle was one of the main points of disagreement between 
Schrödinger’s and Bohr’s conceptions with regard to holism and non-
separability. This is one of the reasons for which Schrödinger was critical towards 
Bohr’s complementarity, viz. wave- particle complementarity and conjugated 
variables complementarity. The progressive rejection of corpuscolarism would 
have brought Schrödinger to a new “ontology” that ascribes criteria of “reality” 
not to particles but to ψ-waves. 
The first consequence of the rejection of corpuscolarism concerns the 
definition of the wave function. A wave-function is clearly defined when only one 
of the two conjugated variables (position or momentum) has been ascribed a 
precise value, whereas the corpuscular representation would lead one to ask for 
the precise value of the momentum of the particle at the very instant when the 
position observable has been measured. Schrödinger developed this argument 
when Bohr formulated the principle of complementarity. 
Secondly, Schrödinger very early – by 1926 – recognized in the wave functions 
the attitude to embody the law-like connection between experimental events that 
seemed to be an index of their “reality”. This interpretation is grist for the mill of 
neo-Kantianism, as Schrödinger’s concern are not localized events, rather laws 
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and relations, which become necessary with respect to the specific domain which 
they refer to. In this regard, the entanglement of our knowledge of the two bodies 
would be nothing but the recognition of a general law-like connection between 
two interacting systems. 
Finally, in his later writings – in the context of the Dublin seminars (1949-
1950) – Schrödinger went on to define the wave functions’ statistical distribution 
as they only have one “objective feature”. He did this by introducing a 
classification regarding particles and ψ-waves. Particles are first-level entities, 
which cannot be objectivized. Ψ-waves are second -level entities, embodying 
statistical regularities, which can be objectivized. Particles can produce localized 
events, while second-level entities like ψ-waves embody statistical regularities. The 
objectivity of ψ-waves rests in their being more than a mathematical tool, showing 
the character of an invariant observation. In this sense they can offer a basis for 
a new “ontology”, although the “ontology” presented here can be conceived as 
an objective reference system or as a structure, not in the traditional sense of 
grasping the things as they are “out there”. 
Schrödinger abandoned his early ontological interpretation of wave functions 
by rejecting the idea of a “one-to-one correspondence” between observable facts 
and ψ-waves, although in the 1950s he still regarded the ψ-function as a picture 
“of something” in abstracto (Bitbol 1996, p. 38), which precluded the “factuality” 
of the wave function, but not its “reality”. 
As mentioned above, between 1925 and 1928 Schrödinger became fully aware 
of the irreducibly holistic character of the wave-mechanical formalism in 
connection with the 3n-dimensionality of the ψ-waves: 
 
The ψ-waves is in general (…) not a function of time and place, but it is a function of one, 
two, three … places if the classical model of the system is made of one, two, three mass 
points. This is a very remarkable and deep-lying circumstance, which – I should mention – 
already makes the conception of the ψ-function as a collection of local states difficult 
(Schrödinger 1929, from Darrigol 1992, p. 259). 
 
The importance of Schrödinger’s holistic standpoint in relation to the analysis of 
the entanglement became evident in 1935 in his reaction to the EPR paper: 
 
 
When two systems, of which we know the states by their respective representatives, enter 
into temporary interaction due to known forces between them, and when after a time of 
mutual influence the systems separate again, then they can no longer be described in the 
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same way as before, viz. by endowing each of them with a representative of its own. I would 
not call that one but rather the characteristic trait of quantum mechanics, the one that 
enforces its entire departure from classical lines of thought (Schrödinger 1935b, p. 555). 
 
Following previous work on statistical mechanics, in which the holistic stance was 
already present, in 1926 Schrödinger gave an account of Einstein’s theory of gases 
in terms of holistic structures of quantum mechanics (Bitbol 1996, p. 22). In 1927 
he provided a precise mathematical form of this in the article “The exchange of 
energy according to wave mechanics”, and later he went to formulate the concept 
of entanglement of wave functions in the articles “The current situation in 
quantum mechanics” and “Discussion of probability relations between separated 
systems” from 1935. 
 
§4. Final remarks: a comparison between the two stances on 
holism and non-separability 
I return briefly to the disagreement between Bohr and Schrödinger with regard 
to their holistic views. As has been mentioned, Bohr’s holistic outlook became 
evident in the mid- 1920s, although elements of holism seem to have emerged 
implicitly as from 1912-1913 in connection with the formulation of the first model 
of the hydrogen atom. However, it is indisputable that in the 1927 Como Lecture 
Bohr termed the quantum of action as “indivisible”, and on that he regarded the 
“indivisibility” of Planck’s constant as the essence of the quantum theory. In fact, 
the individuality of the h guarantees that its momentum cannot be reduced below 
this value. This is a position that undermines the ontological interpretation of 
quantum mechanics: the existence of particles and fields as being essentially 
independent from the observer, as the basic properties of a particle (position and 
momentum) are not simply uncertain to us, rather there is not any other way of 
giving a more accurate definition beyond the limits set by the Heisenberg 
microscope argument. 
As already noted, Bohr’s holistic position was a consequence of his 
assumption that the quantum of action is indivisible and produces unpredictable 
and uncontrollable consequences in each individual case. What is the character 
of Bohr’s holism? 
I argue that Bohr’s view seems to endorse a kind of ontological holism, the 
reason being that Bohr regarded the “phenomenon” (the interaction between 
measuring apparatus and quantum object) not as composed of independently 
physical parts, but as an apparatus-object whole. Moreover, if the quantum object 
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may be taken to exist outside the context of the phenomenon, little can be said 
about its properties. This is a conclusion that fits neatly with the definition of 
ontological holism given at the beginning of this paper. 
Bohr’s holism was a natural consequence of his conception of the quantum 
of action. This conception allowed him to accept and assimilate the EPR 
correlations much more than Schrödinger did, as quantum entanglement was 
already logically presupposed in the 1927 Como lecture. 
From 1935 onwards, Schrödinger continually expressed his concern and 
scepticism about the problem of non-locality of quantum mechanics that he 
recognized as the characteristic trait of the theory. Such a remark was a 
straightforward consequence of considerations concerning the quantum theory 
of measurement, as a measurement operation leads to entanglement between the 
measuring apparatus and the object being measured. 
Schrödinger doubted if the phenomenon of entanglement was not just an 
effect due to an unjustified application of the “non-relativistic formalism” to 
conditions which do not fall in its range of validity. He suggested that the reason 
for the inadequacy of “ordinary quantum mechanics” might be that the 
entanglement appears to involve an “un-retarded actio in distans”, which can only 
occur if the system is “small enough (…) to be able to neglect the time that light 
takes to travel across the system” (Schrödinger 1936, p. 451). 
How can we explain Schrodinger’s reluctance to accept the phenomenon of 
entanglement, one of the physical consequences of wave mechanics? In 
retrospect, if we turn our attention to Schrödinger’s later positions, this 
reluctance seems to derive from a persistence of his corpuscularian 
representation in the holistic framework of wave mechanics (Bitbol 1996). 
However, Schrödinger’s doubts would have been swept away by focusing on 
the structure of ψ-functions, and relinquishing the localized isolated parts – in 
which the aspect of separability would prevail. This is what Schrödinger ultimately 
did by renouncing to deal with the issue of the possible disappearance of the 
entanglement features of the quantum mechanical description of phenomena in 
a future relativistic theory. He pointed out that this entanglement was just an 
appropriate expression of the fundamental lack of individuality of the so-called 
particles; that is to say: the priority given to the whole over the artificially isolated 
parts. This view can be summarized in the well-known quotation: “The best 
possible knowledge of a whole does not imply the best possible knowledge of its 
parts – and here is the mystery (Schrödinger 1935b, p. 555). 
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Among the criteria for ascribing “reality” to ψ -waves we have found the 
“effectiveness” of the wave functions, that is, their ability to embody the law-like 
connection between experimental events. As a matter of fact, when Schrödinger 
rhetorically asked himself: “…are we genuinely interested in the precise value of 
a variable like x or p?” He answered no: “We are interested in general laws, not in 
special facts” (Schrödinger 1995, p. 81). Schrödinger’s attitude also has a strong 
neo-Kantian equivalent, as it considers laws, and relations, as necessary with 
respect to the specific domain to which they refer. In this view, the entanglement 
of our knowledge of the two bodies is but the recognition of a general law-like 
connection between two interacting systems. 
Starting with his early works Schrödinger expressed a non-metaphysical 
approach to the philosophy of physics that became manifest in the attribution of 
some kind of “reality” to ψ-waves. Nevertheless, we should be cautious about the 
connotations of the words “ontology” and “reality”. Ultimately, Schrödinger 
accepted only a restricted kind of ontology corresponding to the definition of an 
appropriate system of entities; that is, a structure of relations. Finally, 
Schrödinger’s interpretation of fundamental themes of quantum mechanics, 
such as holism, separability, particle-like VS wave-like approach, and the EPR 
argument, seems controversial in many respects, and in some cases even quixotic. 
In any case Schrödinger’s originality lies in the fact that he discussed the 
aspect of holism in the light of his previous work in statistical physics, which made 
him become aware that holism was intrinsically related to the statistical behaviour 
of quantum systems. 
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